MEMORANDUM

15

TO: D. Ellsberg

DATE: 8 Nov 67

MEMO NO.: M-7480

FROM: M. Arnsten and F. West

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON ELLSBERG'S BRIEFING

COPIES TO: L. Wheeler, V. Croizat, H. Rowen, J. Digby, G. Shubert, C. Wolf, Jr. W. Graham, R. Levien, H. Averch, E. Blum, E. Lowe, M. Slate, B. Rumph, J. Sibley, P. Tamarkin, B. Dickson

We feel that Ellsberg's ardent advocacy for a reform at the top should be tempered by a sober assessment of some uncertainties related to the proposal:

1. The new candidates for leadership in Vietnam are men of uncertain quality:

   a. We know little about them.

   b. They have little or no experience in governing Vietnam.

   c. They have never been able to agree on a common program and course of action. (Could they agree on radical measures of reform if they came to power?)

   d. They have no well-defined program of reforms.

   e. They have been waiting on the sidelines for over ten years -- or twenty. They have failed to demonstrate dedication and courage: They have not put at risk their lives and fortunes through forceful opposition to the successive Vietnamese governments.

2. The introduction of new men at top level of Vietnamese government is, probably, a necessary but certainly not a sufficient condition for thoroughgoing reforms in Vietnam. Changing leaders is an easier task than changing the behavior of a complex military or civil service organization. Do we know how to reform organizations? Do we have a blueprint? Finally, we suspect that the fruits of a successful reorganization would not become apparent in a year; perhaps, two to five years would be required.

3. In particular, consider blueprints for reforming ARVN. One could undertake any combination of the following measures:

   a. Replace the generals in command of ARVN divisions.

   b. Retrain ARVN (6 months' duration?).

c. Introduce a new system of incentives designed to elicit better performance and behavior.

d. Purge 80% of the officers and half of the NCOs and replace them either by U.S. cadres down to company level or form new Vietnamese cadres who would be chosen on the basis of performance on the field of battle. And the formation of new ARVN cadres would be a slow process lasting years rather than months.

Perhaps the first three measures, which could be implemented in a year, will produce the desired results. However, we think it is likely that the more radical changes described under d. may be necessary, and in that case rapid (under two years) improvement in performance is unlikely.

4. Lessons of Korea. The U.S. took complete control over the Koreans after 1951 and set about retraining, reorganizing and refitting that army from top to bottom -- without any worries of political compromise. The task required great American effort and direct aid. The U.S. Marines, for example, undertook the training of 3,000 Koreans in the following way: (1) boot camps run by Marines; (2) infantry training run by Marines; (3) placement in Korean battalions, each of which had up to 82 Marine advisers (and the advisers could effect on demand the removal of incompetent Korean officers); (4) combat placement with Marine battalions on both flanks.

The process still took over a year and at the end -- in 1953 -- the Koreans were still second-rate. They had to be reinforced when large attacks were imminent and were the weak links on the main line of resistance. Fifteen years later, with the merit and efficiency system firmly in hold throughout the army, the Koreans are a competent armed force.

The lesson shows that in a limited time frame (less than two years), radical changes within any army with an established system and vested interests are unlikely, even given <u>complete</u> control. General Westmoreland, as a brigade commander in Korea in 1953, saw the difficulties and limited success in reorganizing the Koreans in a limited time frame. His reluctance to undertake changes in ARVN is, most probably, a consequence of his belief that such changes might cause more damage than benefit, unless we were prepared to implement changes in a complete manner and over a long (three to six years) time frame.

JRG

24 August 1967

Dan:

Ed is too polite.

I think he really meant (top of page 4, M-5659) he should have thrown away the questions!

There's a considerable "attitude background" that affected this operation more than you know. If you're interested, drop by.

Goldy

JRG:rgs

Dan Ellsberg

H. S. Rowen
D. Ellsberg

MEMORANDUM

TO: H. S. Rowen

M-5659
8-23-67

FROM: E. S. Quade

SUBJECT: SURVEY BASED ON THE ELLSBERG QUESTIONS

COPIES: Management Committee, Research Council

The most charitable thing that can be said about this survey is that it was a failure. We received replies from less than 10% of the professional staff, 52 in total. Four departments did not participate. The respondents lacked background and motivation, making their answers very hard to compare.

To illustrate the difficulties consider the first question. This is the reasonably straightforward query:

1. Who are the best people—most imaginative, most productive—in your field of specialization or interest?

Here 185 people were designated; only seven of these (all RAND staff members or consultants) were named more than once; one, Herb Simon, was mentioned three times. A number of clearly outstanding people were named (Feynman, Pontriagin, Ulam) but some respondents excluded all Nobel prize winners, or Russians, or RAND staff members, or even people whom they felt we would never be able to hire. Several people instead of giving names, tried to list the qualities that might characterize "the best people." For example: "Those people who are given time to use their imagination, background, and creative ability." Another remarked: "Not applicable—I'm a philosopher (i.e., there are such people in my field, and I could list some, but you don't want to know)."

The concept of "field of specialization" gave trouble all the way through, being interpreted so narrowly that the respondent noted that he had difficulty finding anyone else in the same field, and so broadly that the respondent claimed he couldn't answer the question because he had no specialization.

Of the names suggested, I recognized 64 as being associated with RAND as a staff member, former staff member, or consultant. Since I did no checking, one would likely find others. Hence one conclusion that might be drawn is that RAND people have a high opinion of the quality of personnel associated with RAND.

Let me summarize the replies to other questions.

2. Whom in your field of specialization or interest would you like to see on the RAND staff?

The names listed totaled 98; only one was mentioned more than once.

3. What people in other fields than your own would you like to see on the RAND staff?

Eliminating one facetious suggestion, 59 names were suggested, none twice.

4. What are some examples of books, articles, reports, classified projects that "should" have been done at RAND, or that exemplify the most desirable sort of RAND work?

Some 40 odd nominations were made. A number of them were not in sufficient detail for me to be able to identify. [The Department Heads who know the field may be able to do much better.] One publication was mentioned twice; the Report of the Commission on the Year 2000.

5. What books, articles, reports that have come out of RAND are in this class?

Including duplications, there were about 100 nominations. The following were mentioned four times or more:

New Space Handbook, Buchheim and Staff
Linear Programming and Extensions, G. B. Dantzig
Report on a Long Range Forecasting Study, Helmer and Gordon, P-2982
The Small World, J. D. Williams, P-1772-RC.

6. What ongoing projects do you know of at other research institutions, or in the government, that you think should be done at RAND?

Here identification was extremely difficult. Only one project was clearly mentioned more than once, and that with qualifications: Project Hindsight ("if done right" and "but not exactly the way they did it").

7. What work would you like to see done in your department that is not now being done?

8. What work would you like to see done in other departments, or interdepartmentally, that is not now being done?

[Few respondents made a distinction between work in their own departments and elsewhere in RAND. Consequently, I group the answers.]

Many topics were suggested ranging from the theory of laser radar through tax reform to the effect of union policy on technological progress. Mentioned frequently were topics related to (a) medicine (health, biomathematics, hospitals) (b) the non-hardware aspects of computers (impact, limitations, management systems) (c) the post-1975 time period.

9. Comments from respondents

Not many comments were given and few suggested that any work be stopped. Some sample remarks follow:

> "Too much work is done at RAND which is advertised as being of a basic and pioneering nature, but which really isn't. Too often people are familiar with a certain methodology and continually shape problems to fit their talents instead of vice versa. The result is a form of stagnation where problems are worked on long beyond the point where RAND should be deeply involved. Examples include certain aspects of nuclear effects, radar theory, basic laser theory and, I suspect, much of what is done in the Math Department."
>
> "An example of the kind of area that does not need further support at RAND is artificial intelligence, where the ratio of salesmen to scholars is very large."
>
> "One particular problem....of concern to me is the threat to internal security (both in the U.S. and elsewhere) raised by advances in technology coupled with an apparently increasing number of people with no perceived self-interest in the maintenance of the existing order."
>
> "(RAND should) be more active in presenting data on Vietnam to the public. Encourage RAND staff to speak publicly by (1) collating information already published, (2) getting dispositions on how much can be said.

Summary

It now seems to me that most respondents were troubled by uncertainty as to the motivation for the questionnaire and were in doubt as to how the questions were to be interpreted. For guidance, I had tried out the questions on six people. The results of this pilot questionnaire were fairly satisfactory but I drew the wrong conclusion about the way it would go with RAND in general. I neglected to consider that I had spoken to each respondent personally, answered his questions, and let him read the Ellsberg memo before he answered the questions.

I think I could have obtained better results with a lesser expenditure of my time if I had thrown away the answers and just gone around and talked to the fifty-two people.

The filled in questionnaires are being returned (whenever the source can be identified) to the Departments concerned. In many cases, the nature of the answers will make them more useful to the Department Head than they were to me.

E. S. Quade

ESQ:mhb

September 21, 1967 L-17532

Mr. John E. Mueller
Department of Political Science
The University of Rochester
River Campus Station
Rochester, New York 14627

Dear Professor Mueller:

As requested in your letter of May 8, The RAND Corporation is pleased to grant its permission, royalty-free, for you to reprint the RAND paper, entitled, The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices, by Daniel Ellsberg, in your forthcoming book which will be published in 1968 by Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Please give the usual credit in a footnote to the author and the source of the reprinted material.

We would appreciate receiving two complimentary copies of your book when it has been published. These should be sent to Mr. Ellsberg at RAND.

Very truly yours,

THE RAND CORPORATION

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
J. S. KING, JR.

J. S. King, Jr.
Treasurer

JCH:mw

bcc: D. Ellsberg, J. C. Hogan, M. Palmatier

(bcc NOTE: This is RAND P-2183)

3 October 1967
L-18304

Mr. Frederick E. Molting, Jr.
Morgan Guarantee Trust Company
14 Place Vendome
Paris 1^e,
FRANCE

Dear Fritz:

Further to our brief telephone conversation ten days ago in Paris, I want to repeat my invitation to you to spend a day at RAND when you have the time during one of your trips to the United States.

As I mentioned to you, there is a good deal of work going on at RAND dealing with Vietnam, some of which is concerned with trying to learn from previous experience there, and your comments and reactions would be most useful. The general problem which we briefly discussed of how the U.S. can exercise influence without acquiring excessive commitments and responsibility in the process, is one on which we would particularly appreciate any thoughts you may have.

Please let me know whenever you think you could come, either later this month, or on a subsequent trip if that turns out to be more convenient.

Sincerely,

CW:lf

Charles Wolf, Jr.

bcc: R. Belzer
D. Ellsberg
A. Hengel
H. Rowen
G. Shubert

J. Carne
21 Sept 1967

REACTIONS TO "THE WAR GAME"

In my view, the movie "The War Game" is non-constructive. It tries to make one point, but actually succeeds in making quite another, which is potentially destructive of the effort to apply rational thought to the problems of human conflict.

The point it tries to make is that war ought to be abolished, and could be abolished if only the impersonal individuals who cooly discuss the consequences of nuclear war were more sensitive to what it means to the humans involved. The indictment of inhumanity and impersonality falls most heavily on strategists (e.g. Herman Kahn) and their calculations, especially those that indicate that a nuclear war might be something less than a total disaster for all of mankind. But the accusation of inhumanity and impersonality is also extended to theologians who discuss the possibility of a "just war", to the bureaucrats who plan civil defense measures, and even to the volunteers and employees who would carry out these measures if war should occur. All of these, who in one way or another are obliged or willing to "think about the unthinkable" are pictured as living now in a dream world which could turn in a few ~~incredible~~ moments into an all-too-real world of incredible horror and human misery.

By alternating flashes of the "dream world" of those who think about the unthinkable and the unplumbed depths of human misery that would follow a large-scale nuclear war, the film drives home the point implicit in its title: to these people, war is a "game", a deadly game which they should stop playing in order to get to the real problem: how to abolish war. The unstated thesis is that war could be abolished if only they would do this; that is, if the energies that now go into preparing for and planning for war and alleviating its consequencies were to go, instead, into efforts towards peace.

It is this unstated thesis that is the underlying fallacy in the film. The problem is not that planning for war (strategy) is more attractive than working for peace. Every rational and responsible man wants to work for peace and plan for peace. ~~The problem is that~~, in the world as it is today, the study of ~~war~~ conflict may be (and probably is) the most important aspect of the study of peace. Just as, in an individual, an understanding of evil is essential to a knowledge of how to achieve the good, so, among nations, an understanding of ~~war~~ conflict and its resolution, its causes, and its consequences, ~~are~~ is essential to find the road to peace and justice. They are not two separate questions; they are the same question, and those who would avert the kind of human misery depicted in the "War Game" will find that they need to work very hard to understand what the strategists and theologians and civil defense planners are talking about if they are to make a genuine contribution to peace.

It is the discouragement and condemnation of this effort that makes "The War Game" a destructive film. If we took its advice literally, all those who are now working on strategic studies, analyzing post-attack problems, participating in civil defense programs, or grappling with the problem of military power and moral responsibility -- all these would stop what they are doing and turn their attention and energies to something else. But to what? The film does not say. And the reason it does not is that it has nothing else to say: the problem of howto achieve peace (peace with justice, that is, not the false peace of the womb, the tomb or the prison) is at bottom the problem of conflict resolution at low levels of violence, with the risk of war that this entails.

MEMORANDUM

15

TO: Rand Staff

DATE: 8-31-67

FROM: J. R. Goldstein

MEMO NO.: M-5815

SUBJECT: DOD CONTACTS

COPIES TO:

With some new areas of work contemplated, it becomes important that our principal contacts for DOD activities be known and advised of any Rand contacts, written or oral, with the particular agency.

DDR&E: Deputy Director (Electronics and Information Systems) - Cullen Crain
Advanced Research Projects Agency - Except AGILE - Claude Culp
Advanced Research Projects Agency - AGILE - Jim Digby

ASD (Comptroller) - David Novick

ASD (Installations and Logistics) - Murray Geisler

ASD (International Security Affairs) - Jim Digby

ASD (Manpower) - John McCall

ASD (Systems Analysis) - Jim Digby

Defense Atomic Support Agency - Hal Brode

Defense Communications Agency - Cullen Crain

Defense Intelligence Agency - Mert Davies

National Security Agency - Willis Ware

Director of Telecommunications Management* - Cullen Crain

JRG:rgs

Goldy

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*DTM is in the Executive Office of the President, but with ties so close to DOD we show it here.

MEMORANDUM

15 Rev. (7-55)

TO: Rand Professional Staff

DATE: 8-15-67

FROM: H. S. Rowen

MEMO NO.: M-5506

SUBJECT: HONORARIA

COPIES TO:

There is attached a revision to Section 10.D of the Policy and Procedures Guide entitled "Honoraria" which will supersede Section 6.A of the Guide.

This revised policy will permit Rand staff members to retain honoraria from private sources except where a conflict of interest may exist, and will permit Rand to receive the honoraria originating from non-client Government sources.

Any questions concerning the revised policy should be referred to the Treasurer's Office.

Attachment to M-5506
dated 8-15-67

HONORARIA

(Note: This policy does not apply to papers delivered before learned societies which is covered in the Policies and Procedures Guide, Section 10 D.)

1. Employees may retain honoraria paid for speaking engagements subject to the following exceptions:

   (a) No honorarium will be retained by an employee if it originates, either directly or indirectly, from a Government source. Honoraria which may be received from such sources should be endorsed over to Rand; however, honoraria should not be accepted from Rand's clients.

   (b) No honorarium will be accepted by an employee for speaking before an organization where a conflict of interest may exist or appear to exist by reason of the acceptance of a fee.

   (c) Reimbursement for travel expenses may be accepted from Government sources, including Rand's clients. In such cases, the speaker will turn over to Rand such Government payments and will be reimbursed by Rand in accordance with the established Rand travel policies.

   (d) For non-governmental speaking engagements involving travel expenses, no portion of the travel expenses will be borne by Rand.

2. In the event there is a question of conflict of interest with respect to a speaking engagement, the Treasurer's Office will assist the employee in resolving the question.

3. It will be the responsibility of the employee to obtain any required internal security releases with respect to speeches and their publication.

MEMORANDUM

To: S. G. Winter Date 8/18

From: Charles Wolf, Jr.

Re M-4793

Sidney:

(1) Shouldn't the point (and admonition) at the top of p. 2 have a central role in your and Andy's work?

(2) Note my query in the margin on p. 2.

(3) My impression is that a lot of work has been done on aspiration-level mechanisms (I recall a half-page footnote of references in my Means and Ends book several years ago!) — though I agree it's not very good.

(4) You might send a copy of your memo to Dan Ellsberg.

C.

The RAND Corporation

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ed Brunner

DATE: 18 July 1967

FROM: Sid Winter

MEMO NO: M-4793

SUBJECT: THE QUESTIONNAIRE

COPIES TO: R. Nelson, J. Schlesinger, A. Marshall

I find that this questionnaire suffers a good deal from being divorced from its original context in the memo from Dan Ellsberg to Harry, dated March 31, 1967. Indeed, my initial reaction to the questionnaire was quite negative, and I searched out a copy of Dan's memo with the intention of substituting an endorsement of some of Dan's thoughts for an answer to the questionnaire. Much to my surprise, I found that this irritating questionnaire was actually one of Dan's thoughts! That puts the matter in a different light.

The thoughts I wanted to endorse are these: (1) It is of fundamental importance that the RAND research program have a reasonable degree of intellectual coherence -- much more than it has at present, and preferably more than it had in the late fifties. To achieve such coherence, it does not suffice merely to identify important policy problems that are in crying need of an interdisciplinary approach. Neither would it suffice to make RAND a center of excellence in each of the disciplines taken separately. Success depends on picking a set of research fields and problems such that the fields themselves will be stimulated and advanced by their interaction. The reason is simple: Most of the best people in most disciplines are fundamentally dedicated to furthering their disciplines; the opportunity to influence policy will not, ordinarily, provide sufficient incentive for them to disengage themselves from the prevailing academic definitions at good research; (2) See pp. 5-8 of Dan's memo for a list of fields and problems that may well have the desired attributes. I would emphasize, as I am sure he would, that the list must be viewed as a whole. The specific interpretation of each item should be limited and conditioned to some degree by the presence of the other items.

Standing by itself, the questionnaire tends to evoke a frame of reference much narrower than its original context. The respondent is called upon first of all to define his own field of specialization or interest, and lastly to suggest work that he would like to see done in other departments, or interdepartmentally. In my own case, the definition of my field of interest is at least somewhat flexible. It depends on the definition of RAND's field of interest, and what matters most of all is that there be such a definition to which I can try to relate. If asked for my preferred definition, I would say that it's well outlined in Dan's memos, plus portions of the Nelson-Winter memo (M-1367).

Assuming a definition of RAND's interest along those lines, let me propose an answer to questions 7 and 8 of the questionnaire that will illustrate the sort of broad problem that could focus the interest of a large part of RAND: RAND should attack the problem of sorting out the various roles of reward, punishment, threat and promise as influences on the behavior of individual human beings and organizations. An important subtopic involves the role of aspiration level mechanisms in determining the behavioral response to various rewards and punishments. The areas of policy relevance for this sort of work range from the conditions of political stability in urban ghettos or underdeveloped areas to the conduct of disarmament negotiations or coercive nuclear war.

As for the intellectual interest of these subjects, it may be noted first of all that the amount of systematic attention that has been devoted to these questions is incredibly small, considering their fundamental role in determining policy positions. Secondly, there are deep divergences among disciplines in the approach taken to these issues. For example, in experimental psychology there exists fairly impressive evidence that punishment is drastically less effective than reward as an instrument for modifying behavior -- so far as individual behavior in the laboratory is concerned. On the other hand, the sort of aspiration level mechanism assumed in some organization theories seems to assert just the opposite: to modify behavior it is first of all necessary to reduce the satisfactions of current behavior to a level below aspiration. As for economics, it knows nothing of aspiration levels or gain-loss asymmetries, and goes its merry way insisting that bygones are bygones. It seems clear that the process of sorting out these positions and trying to bring various kinds of evidence to bear on the basic issues would be intellectually exciting.

The question of which people one might like to attract to RAND is, unfortunately, too divorced from the realities of our current recruiting situation to be of much interest. In economics, we are hard pressed to compete with leading universities for new Ph.D.'s. Our problem is not that of identifying talented people, but of figuring out ways to attract them that are reasonably consistent with RAND's objectives and resources.

Sidney Winter, Jr.
Economics Department

SW:dc

H. S. Rowen 6/19/67

M-4178

Brownlee Haydon

COMMUNICATIONS

Dan Ellsberg

1. Some of Dan's recollections of indignities ("harassment") imposed on RAND Guests are isolated events not commonplaces.

2. We have had many stimulating exchanges with representatives of the press--Dennis Warner, Frank McCulloch, Stanly Karnow, Art Buchwald, Max Lerner, Edward P. Morgan, Danielle Hunebelle (Réalités), et al -- with no-holds-barred, but at an intellectual level that foreclosed any advantage-taking or back-lash.

3. Normally, journalists come to RAND with a mission--to write about us--and this prerogative defines the character of the encounters: we answer, as far as possible, their inquiries; we volunteer information to counterbalance preconceptions; we seek to neutralize prejudices; we expose them to facets of RAND they don't know about or may find surprisingly at odds with the popular image.

4. We have conducted a deliberate campaign to influence the views of specific individuals--usually, however, as targets of opportunity (lest they suspect our motives). In this category I would place the following visitors I have invited to RAND--every one of whom left with a better understanding of the organization and a friendly attitude (whatever may have been the initial set): H. Stuart Hughes, Dr. Spock, David Reisman, Norman Thomas, (and, invited by others: Urey Bronfenbrenner, Max Lerner, Cassandra, Sidney Hook). (Novick and I spent some time with Walter Lippmann, who may return for a real visit sometime--not this year.)

5. I once asked for a fund to support this activity, to make honoraria easier to obtain and reduce haggling. From what I've said above, it's clear I favor increasing interplay between RAND and outside communities.

6. We have talked about lectureships (a public forum in Santa Monica, as a free, public service), and about a "RAND Lecture" to be given at the Carnegie Institution perhaps annually.

7. I would endorse increased interaction with government people along lines exemplified by the above judiciously selected and carefully arranged. Why haven't McNamara, Rusk, Fulbright, or Bobby Kennedy been invited

to RAND? Any of these visits could be quietly arranged, without embarrassment to them or us.

8. I heartily endorse Dan's suggestion of more internal seminars within RAND--our Interdepartmental Seminars go a long way toward fulfilling this goal (and have been much more frequent than when Dan was here).

9. I think conferences and technical symposia are best initiated by the Departments, but need encouragement (and budget) to materialize.

10. A small group at RAND (including me) occasionally make a hejira to Santa Barbara (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions) but we have not had Hutchins (or others) at RAND. (Harry Ashmore has a standing invitation since his visit to Hanoi and since a visit to the Center was twice postponed because of his pending Pacem in Terris II commitments.)

11. I have no constructive suggestions for implementing a), b), and d) on Dan's page 18, but the above illustrates how my office functions to fulfill c).

Brownlee Haydon

BH/pd

Don Ellsberg

RECORD OF ERC MEETING - 21 MARCH 1968

Present: Ed Brunner
Oleg Hoeffding
Andy Marshall
Dick Nelson
Mal Palmatier
Tony Pascal
Jim Schlesinger
Bob Slighton
Vince Taylor
Charles Wolf, Jr.

1. Charles Wolf reviewed the personnel situation. Stephan Carroll has accepted and will be joining the staff in September. Steven Canby will become a member of Social Science, to which, incidentally, Dick Rainey has transferred. Among the summer visitors will be: Graham Allison, Ken Arrow, Bob Dorfman, Robert Edelstein, Brian Fay, Marty Feldstein, John Hammond, Marc Nerlove, Joel Rosenblatt, Tom Schelling, Bob Summers, Frank Trinkl, T. H. Watkins, Albert Wohlstetter, and Dick Zeckhauser. (In addition, Evelyn White has listed Joe Bower, Ed Mason, and Lt. Plummer, Air Academy.) Charlie remarked that we had about reached the limit -- 18 at present -- and should avoid a repetition of last summer's circus when 23 visitors were present.

2. With the movement of some Rand offices to the former NASA building at Pico and Main, the question of spacial arrangements and the grouping of the departments is again current. The sense of the meeting was that it would be desirable for Economics to move to the old building, closer to the library and perhaps to Social Science.

3. The matter of research assistants and the degree of their specialization in substantive areas was discussed, inconclusively. We will be adding another research assistant with a BA in Economics.

4. Tony Pascal and Dick Nelson raised the question of social affairs for distinguished visitors, especially economists, with the aim of giving the junior members of the department an opportunity to meet such visitors.

5. Substantive work was reviewed by Tony Pascal, Jim Schlesinger, Bob Slighton, and Charlie Wolf. The forthcoming Board meetings, 10-12 April, in Washington were discussed. Jim Hayes, Andy Marshall, Ed Mitchell, Tony Pascal, Jim Schlesinger, and Sid Winter are either actual or possible participants.

(Copies of this report sent to all participants, plus Evelyn White, Dan Ellsberg, and Mac Hoag.)
EDB:mf

Don Ellsberg

RECORD OF ERC MEETING - 29 APRIL 1968

Present:

E. Brunner	M. Palmatier
M. Hoag	A. Pascal
O. Hoeffding	R. Slighton
A. Marshall	V. Taylor
R. Nelson	C. Wolf, Jr.

1. Charles Wolf reviewed recent events. Concerning personnel, he noted that Andy Trapans expects to return to school in September, that Frank Sloan will join the staff in September and will work on the Public Order Project in New York City, and that Chuck Cooper will rejoin the staff sometime this summer. Charlie mentioned that the budget is tight and that austerity in travel, etc., would be helpful. He noted that the Ford Foundation had turned down our proposal for their support of research on economic development but mentioned the possibility of a revolving fund of modest size for this purpose. At the recent Rand Board meetings the subject of soliciting financial support in an endowment or other form was discussed. Charlie reviewed the list of consultants expected this summer, sixteen in toto at present count. He reported on a Rand-TAC meeting last week during which views were openly exchanged and Air Force-Army relationships were discussed. In addition, Charlie reported that Dan Ellsberg had begun a regular seminar on Vietnam and was writing a book in this subject area.

2. Ed Brunner reviewed the current status of the Mid-East project and its forthcoming activities.

3. Tony Pascal discussed the new OEO contract which appears to be in good shape. It will provide $1,000,000 a year for two years for the survey, evaluation, and research efforts.

4. Vince Taylor reviewed Health research, including the forthcoming arrival of the Summerfield team at Rand, and the status of the contract with NY's Health Services Administration. NY apparently wants Rand to concentrate on PPBS efforts which, however, may provide a means of securing later emphasis on matters of greater interest to Rand.

5. Oleg Hoeffding briefly discussed the work on alternative strategies with respect to Vietnam.

6. Bob Slighton discussed progress on the Colombia study for AID.

(Copies of this report sent to all participants, plus Dan Ellsberg, Jim Schlesinger, and Evelyn White.)

EDB:mf

MEMORANDUM

21 November 1968
M-8213

To: Everyone at Rand

From: H. S. Rowen

Subject: THE PRESIDENT'S NEWSLETTER, NO. 2

New V.P. I have given up trying to scoop the Rand grapevine, so let me only confirm what most of you already know: Rand has a new corporate officer. It's Gus Shubert. Gus will have vice-presidential responsibility for developing our nondefense research programs, including finding sources of support. His appointment was effective this past Saturday, by action of the Board of Trustees.

Air Force Advisory Group. The centerpiece of our meeting last week with the AFAG was a discussion of the Project RAND Semiannual Report and the role of the AFAG in helping to formulate the Project RAND program.

The Semiannual Report (AR-400-PR, September 1968) is a new reporting vehicle designed to bring about better understanding in the Air Force of the elements of the Project RAND program and their interrelationships. It reports, project by project, the objectives, activity, future plans, publications and briefing output, manpower, and cost of each study. It was thoroughly staffed throughout the Air Force. The comments it generated provided an agenda for our discussion, moderated by Bruno Augenstein, which ranged generally over the entire program.

The principal outcome of the discussion had to do less with the structure and details of the program than with the role of the AFAG itself as an advisory body for Project RAND. It is clear, I think, that the main reason for establishing the Advisory Group was to provide an instrument by which the Air Force could express the needs of the Air Force and to assess the extent to which Project RAND was meeting these needs. In this capacity, the AFAG would presumably speak with one voice on behalf of all of the Air Force, identifying primary interests, screening requests for major studies, and resolving conflicting priorities. It was generally agreed that this has not been the case. In the months ahead the AFAG will be working toward that objective, and I believe we can look forward, on that account, to a more effective liaison with the Air Force at the highest command level.

The Board and Rand's Twentieth Anniversary Year. Recently a civic leader of Southern California said to me, "Rand is an important national institution located in Southern California, and I don't even know where it is." In the belief that both Rand and the community would benefit from being introduced to one another, members of Rand's Board of Trustees invited a group of distinguished community leaders to join them at the Board meeting last Thursday.

The afternoon session, at Rand, opened with remarks by Board Chairman David Shepard. I gave a brief survey of Rand and its current activities. Mac Hoag discussed the options and constraints President Nixon will face in the field of national security, followed by Stan Greenfield on "Science and the Environment of Man." Board and guests then moved to the Century Plaza Hotel for dinner and discussion of youth in rebellion, led by Martin Lipset, Harvard Professor of Government and Social Relations, who worked on this subject at Rand this past summer.

The visitors:

James Allen, Vice President, Northrop Corp.
Norman Barker, President, United California Bank
Arnold O. Beckman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Beckman Instruments, Inc.
Dr. Peter F. Bing (formerly Executive Director, National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower)
Eli Broad, President and Chairman, Kaufman and Broad Building Co.
John G. Brooks, Chairman and President, Lear Siegler, Inc.
Henry Dreyfuss, Chairman, Industrial Designers Society of America
William P. Gray, U. S. District Judge
Fred L. Hartley, President and Chief Executive Officer, Union Oil Co. of California
Norman B. Houston, Vice President, Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Co.
Frederick G. Larkin, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, Security Pacific National Bank
Henry T. Mudd, President and Chairman, Cyprus Mines Corp.
E. W. Pauley, Chairman, Pauley Petroleum Inc.
Thomas P. Pike, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Pike Corp. of America
Joseph B. Platt, President, Harvey Mudd College
Paul Proehl, Vice Chancellor, University of California at Los Angeles
William A. Simpson, Jr., Chairman, William Simpson Construction Co.
Chauncey Starr, Dean, Engineering Department, University of California at Los Angeles
Harry J. Volk, President, Union Bank of Los Angeles
William R. Whittaker, Chairman, Whittaker Corporation
Paul R. Williams, Architect, Paul R. Williams and Associates
Joseph T. Zoline, Chairman and President, MSL Industries, Inc.

I think the meeting gave our guests a better idea of Rand and its work. We plan similar sessions, to be held in Santa Monica and elsewhere, with the object of creating greater public awareness of what Rand is all about. It is especially important that community leaders understand the nature and extent of our commitment to research on problems of the civil sector, if we are to generate the kind of private support for this work that I discussed in the first issue of this newsletter.

Rand Academic Advisory Board. John Williams once spoke of Rand as a "halfway house--at the crossroads which lead to universities, industry, government, and the public--where

problems, information, and inquiring minds may come together." Our university relations have been important throughout Rand's history. In fact, one of the purposes of Rand, when it was founded twenty years ago to work on national security problems, was precisely to facilitate contributions by university scholars and to make full use of advances in the academic world. This has been possible because of an active exchange, both in personnel and ideas, between Rand and the universities.

Rand's relations with the academic world take many forms. One of these is the recently instituted Rand Academic Advisory Board which will suggest ways of strengthening further our university ties.

Martin Lipset, Harvard University, has agreed to serve as Chairman. In addition to Lipset, the Academic Advisory Board so far includes:

James Coleman, Johns Hopkins University
Murray Gell-Mann, California Institute of Technology
Nathan Glazer, Harvard University
Willard Libby, University of California at Los Angeles
Hans Mark, University of California at Berkeley and Livermore Laboratories
Albert Wohlstetter, University of Chicago

Speaking of university ties, we have recently completed a Rand-wide survey of university-level teaching by Rand staff members (either before or after coming to Rand) at institutions throughout the United States and abroad between 1964 and 1968. Its purpose was to give some idea of the breadth of university experience represented by the Rand staff. Results showed that in the social sciences, including architecture, business administration, economics, health and medicine, linguistics, political science, psychology, sociology, and urban planning, 137 courses and seminars were taught by 70 current staff members during the four-year period. Fifty-nine staff members taught 143 courses in the physical and engineering sciences and mathematics; aeronautics; astronomy and meteorology; chemistry and chemical engineering; electrical, industrial, and mechanical engineering; mathematics; operations research; and physics. Ten courses in English and philosophy were also taught by seven Rand people.

Invention. Rand is usually thought of as an organization whose output is purely verbal--reports and briefings and other collections of symbols. But I was reminded of the fact that Rand creativity also takes other forms when I read U.S. Patent No. 3,399,401, Digital Computer and Graphic Input System, by Tom Ellis and Mal Davis, who, in the ritualistic language of patent law, are "assignors, by mesne assignments, to the United States of America as represented by the Secretary of the Army."

This patent, for the Rand Tablet, was awarded four years and two months after filing. It is clear that Andy Wessel's project to speed the search and interrogation of Patent Office files is urgently needed.

The impressiveness of the Tablet comes through fairly well in the formal language of the patent. But I cannot refrain from sharing with you one breathless sentence in the patent:

> The signal from the not-valid toggle 64 is also fed to an inverter 67 and thence on line 68 to an AND gate 69 where the signal inversion deactivates the twenty parallel gates 71 and prevents the parallel feeding of the bit information in the shift register 58 over lines 72 and 73 to the output register 74 which normally feeds to the computer 55, over lines 75, the natural binary number of the stylus position on the tablet as determined in the immediately completed scanning cycle.

In other areas the rocky road from invention disclosure to patent was begun by six disclosures in the first nine months of 1968. Three were Project RAND inventions and were transmitted to the Air Force; the other three were outside the scope of Rand's work and were released to the inventors.

I was glad to have your comments on the first newsletter, and I'm sure that I can expect some on this one. Feel free.

Harry